Getting South Africa Working
Constitutional Amendments
The DA Constitution is the governing document of the party. It sets out how the DA is structured, how decisions are made, and how leadership is elected and held to account.
Proposed amendments to the Constitution are debated and voted on by delegates on Saturday 11 April. Any amendment passed at Federal Congress becomes binding on the party.
Clause: 2.3.1
Title: Voting
Proposed by: Zwelixolile Alfred Lewane
Proposed amendment:
Delete: 2.3.1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, voting at meetings of all bodies of the Party is by a show ofhands, unless a secret ballot is required by the person presiding or by one-tenth of the members present.
Proposer’s motivation:
The voting method that is used to vote is against the secret ballot voting method. That formed by the constitution of South Africa 1996, and the 17th amendments to the constitution schedule 3 amended by section 2 of act No 3 of 1999, by section 19 act No 34 of 2001, by section 3 of act No 21 of 2002
Election procedure if more than one candidate is nominated, a vote must be taken athe meeting by secret ballot
Voting by rising or lifting a hand is possibly makes people hate each other. Or bringing unnecessary fights in the party ororganisation. As the candidate might feel unwanted if majority people didn’t vote for him or her.
The solution is to bring the method of elecronical or ballot voting method, which can makes the candidates don’t know who vote against or in favour for them
Clause: 2.3.1
Title: Voting
Proposed by: Jan Harm Steenkamp
Proposed amendment:
2.3.1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, voting at meetings of all bodies of the party is by a show of hands, unless secret ballot is required by the person presiding or by one-tenth of the members present will be by means of an appropriate electronic voting system that is deemed free and fair unless this option is not available whereby a show of hands for voting purposes will be deemed sufficient if the person presiding or by one-tenth of the members present so choose otherwise.
Proposer’s motivation:
Clause: 2.3.2.1
Title: Voting
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
2.3.2.1 a teleconference or online meeting shall only be regarded as a meeting if a quorum of the participants is present and if notice of such a teleconference or online meeting has been given to the members; and further provided that, where a secret ballot is requested, voting shall take place at a special meeting called thereafter or through an electronic voting system that adheres to the provisions of this constitution, provided all attendees have access to such an electronic voting system. Where an attendee does not have access to an electronic voting system in the instance of a secret ballot, they may convey their vote to the presiding officer for capturing or must be allowed to cast their vote after the meeting within a period determined by the presiding officer, and
Proposer’s motivation:
to allow for online meetings and voting procedures during such meetings
Clause: 2.5.2
Title: Standards of Conduct of Party Members
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
2.5.2. All Party members including public representatives, submit to the right of the Party, to terminate their membership, to remove them from office in any executive or legislative sphere of government or office within the Party, or to be moved to a position deemed to be suitable by the Party, on the grounds of incapacity owing to poor performance and/or ill health, which includes but is not limited to incompetence and/or inefficiency and/or incapability, but only in terms of processes andprocedures prescribed by the Federal Council.
Proposer’s motivation:
The current provision only makes provisions for very specific grounds of incapacity (poor performance and/or ill-health), while there are far more variations on which a person can be found to be incapable of fulfilling their duties. By deleting the limiting provision in this clause, the Party will be able to govern the nature of different instances of incapacity by means of regulation, which will be a more dynamic process with greater reactivity and adaptability to changes in legal best practice.
Clause: 2.5.4.14
Title: Standards of Conduct of Party Members
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
2.5.4.14. in any way intimidates or sexually harasses in any manner, any member of the Party or staff members, staff member employed or prospectively employed by the Party, or staff member employed or prospectively employed by government;
Proposer’s motivation:
This clause is being limited to sexual harrassment, with “ordinary” harrassment being addressed under a separate section. The sexual harrassment of government staff is also being included here.
Clause: 2.5.4.15
Title: Standards of Conduct of Party Members
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
2.5.4.15. discloses or causes the disclosure in any way any sensitive and/or confidential information in a closed meeting, as may be defined in terms of a policy adopted by the Federal Council, with anybody outside that meeting other than a person authorised to receive it in terms of a policy adopted by the Federal Council that policy;
Proposer’s motivation:
This amendment seeks to tighten up on the confidentiality of closed meetings and the information discussed and emanating from those meetings. With leaks from Party structures being a persistent problem, amending this section will permit the Party tohold the full chain of those involved in any leak of sensitive or confidential information accountable. It is, however, imperative that the policy governing confidentiality and closed meetings be revised as well.
Clause: 2.5.4.18
Title: Standards of Conduct of Party Members
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 2.5.4.18. in any way intimidates, harasses, and/ or seeks to exert undue influence over any member of the Party or staff member deemed to be employed by the Party, or staff member employed or prospectively employed by government;
Proposer’s motivation:
Clause is proposed to provide protection from intidimdation, harrassment, or undue influence being exerted by members of the Party over others, including staff.
Clause: 2.5.4.19
Title: Standards of Conduct of Party Members
Proposed by: Benedicta van Minnen
Seconded by: Gregory Peck
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 2.5.4.19. as a member of a regional or provincial executive, and who is aware, or is made aware, of prima facie evidence of misconduct by a member that breaches Section 2.5.4 or Section 3.5 of the Federal Constitution, and who does not report such evidence to the Federal Executive is guilty of misconduct.
Proposer’s motivation:
The FLC has dealt with matters where members of regional or provincial executives are aware of misconduct by members but admit not reporting it or trying to manage the misconduct with it to backfire when that member is either caught or the behaviour escalates. Regional and Provincial Executives should not be able to protect and filter such information as it is not in the best interests of the Party.
Clause: 2.5.6
Title: Standards of Conduct of Party Members
Proposed by: Nonhlanhla Sifumba
Seconded by: Beverly Jacobs
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 2.5.6. All public representatives of the Party, shall be subject to an annual performance review.
2.5.6.1. The review shall be conducted by the relevant Constituency Committee in consultation with the Provincial Executive.
2.5.6.2. The review shall include, but not be limited to, performance indicators relating to:
constituency work and community engagement,
attendance and participation in caucus and legislative activities,
responsiveness to constituents’ concerns, and
compliance with Party policy and constitutional obligations.
2.5.6.3. The outcomes of the performance review shall be reported to the Federal Council and may form the basis for corrective measures, mentoring, or disciplinary action, where necessary.
2.5.6.4. Public representatives shall have a right to appeal review outcomes to Federal Council.
Proposer’s motivation:
Accountability: While the current Constitution provides for disciplinary action in cases of misconduct or incapacity, it does not provide for proactive and structured performance monitoring.
Early Intervention: Annual reviews ensure underperforming representatives are identified and supported before problems escalate.
Public Trust: A transparent review process enhances the DA’s reputation as the party of good governance and accountability, strengthening its case to voters.
Internal Alignment: By linking constituency feedback with leadership oversight, the DA ensures that its public representatives remain grounded in community needs.
Clause: 3.1.7
Title: Membership
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment :
3.1.7 Anyone who applies for membership or renews their membership via the online website an approved online application shall not be required to sign a membership form.
Proposer’s motivation:
Although a website is a good place for membership renewal we must be open to other types of technology that can do the same. This proposal is intended to widen the options for online membership sign up
Clause: 3.2.1
Title: Refusal of Membership
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment :
3.2.1. A Regional or Provincial Executive may itself or at the recommendation of a branch or constituency refuse to accept the application for membership of any person other than a public representative, who joined the Party in terms of section 3.1.1. within 60 days of the payment of the membership subscription by such a person at the relevant regional or provincial office in a manner prescribed by this constitution.
Proposer’s motivation:
Due to online membership sign up not all members will physically pay their membership at an office.
Clause: 3.2.2
Title: Refusal of Membership
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
3.2.2. An individual whose membership has ended is perpetually inadmissible for membership if their membership ended under the following circumstances and for any of the reasons listed in clauses 3.2.2.1 – 3.2.2.4 may not be readmitted for membership nor be eligible for nomination as a public representative in such case, without the and may only be considered for readmission as a member upon application, which application is subject to the consideration and express approval of the Federal Executive after consultation with the relevant Provincial Executive.
Proposer’s motivation:
Clears up and clarifies the application of this section
Clause: 3.2.3
Title: Refusal of Membership
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
3.2.3. Any individual who is perpetually inadmissible for membership in terms of clause 3.2.2 is deemed to not be a valid member even where such person submits a valid membership application form to the party or applies for membership online, the submission of which does not constitute readmission of membership. In the event that any person deemed to be perpetually inadmissible for membership in terms of sections 3.2.2.1 – 3.2.2.4 submits, without following the procedure and obtaining the permission set out in section 3.2.2, a membership application form to the Party, or applies for membership online, such submission and or application shall be null and void, even if administratively processed and ostensibly approved.
Proposer’s motivation:
Further tightens down on loopholes that perpetually inadmissable persons seek to exploit for readmission as members of the Party
Clause: 3.4
Title: Dual Membership
Proposed by: Paul Kotzé
Seconded by: Jan-Hendrik Cronje
Proposed amendment :
Delete: 3.4. A member or category of members of the Party may also be a member or members of another party or parties approved by the Federal Council for the period and on conditions determined by the Federal Council.
Proposer’s motivation:
This clause, allowing membership in other parties with Federal Council approval, is anachronistic and creates significant risk. It contradicts the principle of loyalty and dedication to the DA’s mission. In a modern political landscape, it could lead to conflicts of interest, espionage, and a diluted Party identity. The potential downsides vastly outweigh any perceived benefits of attracting members from other parties, who should simply resign and join the DA outright.
Clause: 3.5.1.13
Title: Cessation of Membership
Proposed by: Paul Kotzé
Seconded by: Jan-Hendrik Cronje
Proposed amendment:
3.5.1.13. being a public representative of the Party in a legislative body, in any meeting of that legislative body, votes in a manner other than in accordance with a Party caucus decision which is consistent with Party policy, in that legislative body, or being a single public representative in a caucus votes in a manner inconsistent with the instructions of higher Party structures or Party policy: save in the case where the Party allows a free vote on the issue being voted on, or the caucus has given permission for that member to vote in a particular manner; or the caucus decision constitutes a material breach of a coalition agreement approved by the Federal Executive in terms of section 6.3.3.8, and the member has formally lodged his or her objection with the caucus leadership prior to the vote;
Proposer’s motivation:
This creates a crucial safeguard. It protects a member from expulsion for upholding a higher Party principle (an approved coalition agreement) over a flawed caucus decision. It balances caucus discipline with strategic accountability to the Party’s central agreements.
Clause: 3.5.1.15
Title: Cessation of Membership
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
3.5.1.15. being a public representative of the Party in a legislative body, in any meeting of that legislative body, is absent from or leaves the meeting at a time a vote is to be taken without obtaining permission from the relevant caucus leadership on a matter that has been agreed by the caucus, in a situation in which leaving the meeting prevents the decision from being taken, or which causes or results in a decision being taken that is contrary to the agreed caucus position
Proposer’s motivation:
We have had instances where members were simply absent from proceedings entirely, causing a vote to go wrong. The current wording is very specifically aimed at preventing someone from leaving the meeting, but does not deal with instances where such person is simply absent to start off with.
Clause: 3.5.1.17
Title: Cessation of Membership
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 3.5.1.17. being a public representative of the Party in a legislative body, promotes and/or argues a position in a meeting of that legislative body that is contrary to a decision of the relevant Party caucus decision.
Proposer’s motivation:
There have been instances where DA councillors have gone entirely off script, making speeches entirely in contradiciton to the official decision of the caucus. This has caused great embarrassment and cannot be dealt with in terms of 3.5.1.13. These occurences must be avoided at all costs.
Clause: 3.5.3
Title: Cessation of Membership
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
3.5.3. The process or processes to be followed in the case of cessation under this section will be determined by the FLC Rules, which may require any legal challenge to cessation to be determined by arbitration.
Proposer’s motivation:
See 3.5.4, this amendment is a consequential amendment.
Clause: 3.5.4
Title: Cessation of Membership
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 3.5.4. Any legal challenge relating to the outcome of cessation processes concluded in terms of the FLC Rules must be adjudicated by means of compulsory arbitration prior to approaching a court for relief.
Proposer’s motivation:
Aim is to avoid having cessation matters going directly to court, seeking to make arbitration compulsory in such instances.
Clause: 3.6.3
Title: Only Members Can Serve
Proposed by: Phumudzo Prince Mabirimisa
Seconded by: Ramokgopa Daniel Maferera
Proposed amendment:
3.6.3. Only members in good standing for at least 30 days 6 months are eligible to serve in any elected position in the Party.
Proposer’s motivation:
It’s discouraging for some loyal DA members to see someone decampaigning the DA non stop in favour of a different political party, only for that person to suddenly become a DA member and become a party representative after 30 days whilst there are other equally deserving loyal DA members who’ve been doing the groundwork for years. 6 months waiting period/probation will also test the loyalty and motive of such new members coming from other parties.
Clause: 3.7.2
Title: Branches
Proposed by: Phumudzo Prince Mabirimisa
Seconded by: Ramokgopa Daniel Maferera
Proposed amendment:
Insert: Branches shall form an integral part of the formal performance assessment process of political heads assigned to them (including any ward and/or PR councillors allocated to the wards served by that branch),
Proposer’s motivation:
Branches must form an integral part in the formal continuous performance assessments of their Political Heads and PR&Ward Councillors within their areas of jurisdiction in order to ensure that there is service delivery and the party is active on the ground and that the party holds to account those public representatives who may be underperforming. Report on findings of branches may periodically (monthly/quarterly/bi-annually/yearly). This may/would be done using a generic format (consisting of questionnaires, comment sections, recommendation sections, etc) from the Federal/Provincial level. Branches enjoy powers and functions granted to them in terms of chapter 3 of the constitution.
Clause: 3.11.2
Title: Formation of Branches
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
3.11.2. A branch may only be formed if the Provincial Executive or, where applicable, the Regional Executive, certifies that there are at least 25 members within the area of jurisdiction of the branch in terms of a procedure approved by Federal Council.
Proposer’s motivation:
This clause empowers the ongoing establishment of branches outside the official audit date, provided that their membership has been certified by the relevant executive. This insertion proposes that a province must have an in-year membership audit procedure in place in order to allow for an executive to make the certification that a branch has achieved the membership threshold.
Clause: 4.3.1
Title: Allocation and Responsibilities of Constituency Representatives
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
4.3.1. The Provincial Executive must, after having demarcated as provided in this Constitution, and after consultation with the MPs and MPLs and any councillors which it contemplates allocating as constituency heads, and regional executives where these exist, and the constituency executives, allocate one or more Member/s of Parliament or the Provincial Legislature, to a constituency as the Constituency Head/s unless an MP/ MPL is unfit for such role or allocated other duties in the Party precluding them from functioning as a constituency head (subject to approval by the Federal Executive), provided that such other duties shall be commensurate in party political organisation workload with that of a constituency head. A Provincial Executive may, with the approval of the Federal Executive, assign a councillor as a Constituency Head.
Proposer’s motivation:
Not all MPs/ MPLs are fit to be constituency heads and should not be allocated to this role. Some MPs/ MPLs are more valuable in other leadership roles for the Party that often preclude them from spending the requisite time in their constituencies to provide the necessary leadership. Rather than having only 20% of a constituency head’s time it is better to allocate someone else to lead a constituency that will be more hands-on. The party political workload of MPs/ MPLs not allocated a constituency should equal that of a constituency head and they cannot be allowed to only do legislative duties they must still contribute to the growth of the DA.
Clause: 5.1.5
Title: Provincial Constitutions
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
5.1.5.1. Provinces must within six months after the acceptance of any amendments to the Federal Constitution which conflict with their Provincial Constitutions, amend their Provincial Constitutions to bring them in line with the Federal Constitution, provided that if no Provincial Congress takes place within that period, the province must implement the changes by way ofrules adopted by the Provincial Council or Provincial Executive, which rules shall have the status and effect of constitutional imperatives: Provided further that the.
5.1.5.2. Any amendments to the Federal Constitution shall take effect immediately after they are passed, regardless of whether the Provincial Constitutions have been amended unless a special dispensation is granted by the Federal Executive on the basis that it is impossible in the particular circumstances.
Proposer’s motivation:
Current wording is clumsy.
Clause: 5.1.6
Title: Provincial Constitutions
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Insert: Any amendment to a Provincial Constitution only takes effect upon the completion of the certification process provided for in terms of clause 5.1.6 and the subsequent ratification thereof by the Federal Executive or Federal Council, whichever of these bodies meets soonest following the completion of the certification process.
Proposer’s motivation:
Currently, caucus rules can only be ratified by Federal Executive. This amendment seeks to speed up the process for the ratification of Provincial Constitutions.
Clause: 5.3.3
Title: Regional Structure
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Delete: 5.3.3 Any amendment to a Provincial Constitution only takes effect upon the approval of that amendment by the Federal Council.
Proposer’s motivation:
Addressed in reorganisation above
Clause: 6.1.2
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Anton Bredell
Seconded by: Dennis Ryder
Proposed amendment:
6.1.2. The Federal Congress:
6.1.2.1. generally meets at least once every three five years, but on a date as close as possible to the date 24 (twenty four) months before the five year anniversary of the last national and provincial elections.
6.1.2.2. will, irrespective of the provisions of clause 6.1.2.1, and as a transitionary arrangement, be convened to take place as close as possible to 10 April 2030, and thereafter as close as possible to 10 April 2033, after which clause 6.1.2.1 will come into effect.
6.1.2.3. Notwithstanding any other provisions, the Federal Congress must be convened at any time by a two-thirds majority vote of the Federal Executive, a two-thirds majority vote of the Federal Council, or when requested by a petition signed by at least five thousand members of the Party.
6.1.3. All provincial congresses must be convened to take place in the period six months before the Federal Congress.
Proposer’s motivation:
Rationalisation and alignment of Federal- and provincial congresses to align with national and provincial election timeframes (every 5 years) and to enable leadership to better implement plans of actions over a five-year period, as the current three-year period is generally too short for proper implementation of longer term plans and projects
Clause: 6.1.3.7
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Pogiso Mthimunye
Seconded by: Ofentse Madzebatela
Proposed amendment:
6.1.3.7. any co-opted members of the Federal Executive without voting rights unless they have voting rights in another capacity;
Proposer’s motivation:
Co-opted members are vital for providing specialised expertise to our Executive Committee. They bring essential skills and expert insights that strengthen our strategy.
However, it is a fundamental principle of democracy that voting rights belong to those with an elected mandate.
Co-opted individuals are selected for their technical skills, rather than being elected by our members or through internal structures. As such, they are not directly accountable to any representative body within the party.
To uphold the integrity and democratic legitimacy of our Federal Congress, we must ensure that all votes cast reflect a substantive mandate from the party’s constituency. Therefore, co-opted members should not have voting rights at the Federal Congress.
This is a matter of democratic accountability—ensuring that the party’s ultimate decisions rest with those directly chosen by the party’s members and those who are elected public representatives.
Clause: 6.1.3.8
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Pogiso Mthimunye
Seconded by: Ofentse Madzebatela
Proposed amendment:
6.1.3.8. the Provincial Leader, one Deputy Provincial Leader and the Provincial Chairperson, if any, and a maximum of two Deputy Chairpersons per province;
Proposer’s motivation:
All provinces have Deputy Chairpersons who have elected mandates from sub-provincial structures of the Party and fulfil various roles delegated to them by the Provincial Executive. Their representation at a Federal congress reflects the elected mandate they carry from their constituent structures.
Clause: 6.1.3.10.1
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Pogiso Mthimunye
Seconded by: Ridwaan Smith
Proposed amendment :
6.1.3.10.1. local government councillors equal to five six times the number of Members of Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures in the country, allocated to the provinces on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by the Party in that province in the last election of a national nature; and
Proposer’s motivation:
Municipal Councillors are the absolute backbone of the DA, standing on the frontline of service delivery and good governance in communities across the country.
Councillors are uniquely positioned as they constantly field questions from voters on the full spectrum of our work—from local council decisions to DA provincial mandates, and even our programmes and policies in the National Assembly. They are the party’s essential link to the concerns of the people.
A wider, more representative inclusion of Councillors at the Federal Congress is therefore a crucial step forward. It is vital for ensuring that the strategic decisions of the party are directly informed by the real-world realities faced on the ground.
This enhanced representation is a necessary movement toward achieving the ultimate goal of full, comprehensive inclusion of all our Public Representatives at the Federal Congress, solidifying a truly representative mandate.
Clause: 6.1.3.10.2
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Pogiso Mthimunye
Seconded by: Ridwaan Smith
Proposed amendment:
6.1.3.10.2. non-public representative delegates allocated to branches and elected by a proportional voting system approved by the Federal Council or Federal Executive, which shall not comprise less than 45% 50% of the total Congress delegates;
Proposer’s motivation:
The Democratic Alliance (DA) is a growing force, actively participating in governments across all spheres. To match this expansion with robust internal governance, we must ensure our highest decision-making structure remains a foundation of transparency, balance, and honesty.
This is why we champion an equal representation of our public officials and non-public representatives.
This balanced approach achieves several critical goals:
It delivers an honest and realistic reflection of our performance—in government, in opposition, and the actual state of our ground structures.
It serves as a vital check and balance, preventing the disproportionate influence of elected members over the party’s core operations and vision.
Crucially, it boosts the prospects of our Congress adopting resolutions that reflect the most representative view of the DA on the key issues facing South Africa today.
This structure is a commitment to good governance within the party, ensuring we remain accountable and focused on delivering the Open Opportunity Society for All
Clause: 6.1.3.10.2
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Nonhlanhla Sifumba
Seconded by: Beverly Jacobs
Proposed amendment:
6.1.3.10.2. non-public representative delegates allocated to branches and elected by a proportional voting system approved by the Federal Council or Federal Executive, which shall not comprise less than 45% 55% of the total Congress delegates;
Proposer’s motivation:
Grassroots Democracy: Federal Congress is the highest decision-making body of the DA. Increasing the proportion of non-public representatives ensures that ordinary members, activists, and volunteers have a stronger voice in shaping Party policy and leadership.
This amendment also ensures that Federal Congress remains grounded in the voice of ordinary members by guaranteeing that at least 55% of delegates are non-public representatives, elected proportionally from branches. It strengthens internal democracy, keeps public representatives accountable to the grassroots, and safeguards the principle that the party ultimately belongs to its members.
Clause: 6.1.3.10.3
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Nonhlanhla Sifumba
Seconded by: Beverly Jacobs
Proposed amendment:
Insert:
6.1.3.10.3. Of the delegates referred to in 6.1.3.10.2, at least 10% shall be members under the age of 31 years at the date of election, to ensure meaningful representation of youth voices in the highest policy-making body of the Party.
Proposer’s motivation:
Youth Empowerment: South Africa is a youthful country. Guaranteeing youth representation in Federal Congress strengthens intergenerational leadership and positions the DA as the party of opportunity and future growth.
Diversity & Renewal: This amendment ensures Federal Congress reflects the DA’s values of Fairness, Diversity, and Opportunity by institutionalising inclusivity in its highest structures.
Electoral Advantage: A visible commitment to youth participation and grassroots empowerment resonates with voters who often perceive politics as distant and elite driven.
Clause: 6.1.3.11
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
6.1.3.11. The Federal Leader (where applicable), Federal Chairperson and provincial chairpersons (where applicable) of all constituted ancillary bodies recognised in terms of Chapter 11 of this constitution, unless otherwise specified.
(Consequential deletions of existing 6.1.3.11, 6.1.3.12 and 6.1.3.13)
Proposer’s motivation:
DASO, for instance, is currently an ancillary with fedex representation but not specified in this section (although 6.1.3.17 may cover this). Other ancillaries may be approved in future as well. Numbering will have to change as a consequence.
Clause: 6.1.4
Title: Federal Congress
Proposed by: Pogiso Mthimunye
Seconded by: Duncan Mthembu
Proposed amendment:
6.1.4. The Federal Congress elects the Federal Leader, the Deputy Federal Leader, the Federal Chairperson and the Deputy Federal Chairpersons.
Proposer’s motivation:
The DA’s pivotal role in the National Government has placed unprecedented demands on the Federal Leader.
The Leader is tasked with the critical responsibilities of:
Guiding the party’s direction within the GNU.
Clearly differentiating the DA’s performance and values from the broader GNU coalition.
Steering the National Assembly Caucus.
Supporting our provincial governments and metros
Leading public engagement on contentious legislation, such as the NHI and BELA Bills.
This intense focus on government has created a degree of vacuum: the voice of the DA in government has often eclipsed the party’s voice on its own, particularly in robustly opposing problematic national legislation.
We must correct this imbalance to ensure our members and voters are fully engaged and informed.
Our Proposed Solution: A Dedicated Deputy Federal Leader
The election of a Deputy Federal Leader, with clear delegation from the Federal Leader, will decisively address this workload crisis. This role would specifically focus on:
Intensively engaging with party structures to ensure they are aligned and mobilised.
Communicating directly with voters regarding the party’s strategy and progress within government.
Acting as a crucial link between the parliamentary caucus, the party leadership, voters, and our ground structures, all under the Federal Leader’s overall direction.
Furthermore, we must plan for the future. The very real possibility of a DA President of South Africa makes a strong Deputy Federal Leader essential. This individual would provide integral support to the President, ensuring both the successful running of the state and the good health of the party organisation are maintained simultaneously.
This is a necessary investment in leadership to ensure the DA’s continued growth, accountability, and effectiveness.
Clause: 6.3.1.10
Title: Federal Executive
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
6.3.1.10. The Leader, or their nominee, of each Ancillary Body approved by the Federal Council in terms of Chapter 11 of the Federal Constitution. The Provincial Chairpersons;
Proposer’s motivation:
Very few of the ancillary bodies in the party are currently functioning. Those that are aimed at specific target markets do not possess sufficient organisational capacity or much of a following. In many instances the leadership battles for the ancillary bodies have become proxy battles for factions in the party who are also represented on fedex. Thus the leadership of ancillaries are not properly held to account. If the stakes are lowered in these leadership battles there is a better opportunity that the leadership of these bodies would be there for the right reasons and that could improve the functioning of especially the target market ancillaries. They will retain their representation on federal council where they will remain accountable for their activities.
Adding provincial chairs to the fedex will make the body more of a functional executive since provincial chairs are responsible for the execution of administrative functions as well as performance management and campaigns in their provinces and the linkage to fedex will improve this functionality and the buy-in by provinces into national campaigns for instance.
The current fedex consists of 33 positions (34 if you include the parliamentary leader but this position is also held by the party leader). The proposed reconfiguration with the lowering of co-options will bring it to 34 members (35 if the party leader and parliamentary leaders are not the same) thus not really impacting on the size and ability to quorate of the body.
Clause: 6.3.1.15
Title: Federal Executive
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
6.3.1.15. the Chief Executive Officer, or Chief Operating Officer in their absence, without voting rights;
Proposer’s motivation:
The DA currently does not have a CEO and the COO can fulfil that role in the CEOs absence. It should also be amended in all other sections where only the CEO is mentioned.
Clause: 6.3.1.16
Title: Federal Executive
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
6.3.1.16. up to six four members co-opted by a two-thirds majority of the Federal Executive by secret ballot.
Proposer’s motivation:
Ensuring that coopted members have specific functions also ensures that they are not abused for voting purposes on the executive.
In light of proposal to replace ancillaries with provincial chairs: The current fedex consists of 33 positions (34 if you include theparliamentary leader but this position is also held by the party leader). The proposed reconfiguration with the lowering of co-options will bring it to 34 members (35 if the party leader and parliamentary leaders are not the same) thus not really impacting on the size and ability to quorate of the body.
Clause: 6.3.8
Title: Federal Executive
Proposed by: Frederick Petrus Nel
Seconded by: Crezanne Bosch
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 6.3.8. The Federal executive shall report to each Federal Council meeting on its decisions taken.
Proposer’s motivation:
Since the fedex executes the powers and function of the federal council in its absence (6.3.3.1) the federal council does have a right to accountability from fedex for its decisions similar to that of the NMC to the fedex.
Clause: 6.4
Title: National Management Committee
Proposed by: JP Smith
Seconded by: Solly Malatsi
Proposed amendment:
The day-to-day management of the administration of the Party is entrusted to a National Management Committee consisting of the Federal Leader, the Parliamentary Leader if the Leader is not a Member of Parliament, the Federal Chairperson and Deputy Federal Chairpersons, the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairpersons of the Federal Council, the Chief Executive Officer, the Federal Chairperson of Finance, the Chief Whip of the National Assembly and such other persons as may be co-opted to assist, subject to the agreement of the Federal Executive. The National Management Committee shall report to each Federal Executive meeting on its activities and any decisions taken.
Proposer’s motivation:
The Federal Deputy Chairs were previously included in the NMC on a co-opted basis. The Deputy Chairs are elected with a very substantial mandate from the full delegates at the Congress and as the NMC includes the Deputy Chairperons of Federal Council, including the Federal Deputy Chairpersons would achieve a symmetry in the treatment of the deputies and confirm their right to attendance of the NMC explicitly is preferable to leaving it to co-option.
Clause: 7.2.5.3
Title: The Federal Chairperson
Proposed by: JP Smith
Seconded by: Dr Ivan Meyer
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 7.2.5.3. with the support of the Deputy Federal Chairpersons, takes responsibility for internal cohesion, dispute resolution and mediation where requested to by Fedex
Proposer’s motivation:
The Federal Chairperson receives a very clear leadership mandate from Congress. As has been acknowledged by the leadership of Federal Council, managing disputes and conflict takes up signficant energy and time of Chairperson of Federal Council. The mandate obtained at Congress by the Federal Chairperson would empower the Chair to greatly assist in managing disputes and party cohesion.
Clause: 7.3.5
Title: The Federal Deputy Chairpersons
Proposed by: JP Smith
Seconded by: Anton Bredell
Proposed amendment:
7.3.5. any other function assigned by the Federal Chairperson and approved by the Federal Executive at its first meeting after the Federal Congress, including but not limited to:
7.3.5.1. DA government oversight and development;
7.3.5.2. monitoring and oversight of legal matters involving the Party; and
7.3.5.3. talent acquisition/recruitment.
Proposer’s motivation:
The report from the previous review panel recommended the possible additions of the following additional roles allocated to Deputy Federal Chairpersons:
A deputy chairperson for DA government oversight and development
A deputy chairperson for legal matters
A deputy chairperson for talent acquisition
Clause: 7.8
Title: The Deputy Federal Leader
Proposed by: Mzamo Billy
Seconded by: Nicola Du Plessis
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 7.8. The Deputy Federal Leader
The Deputy Federal Leader shall:
7.8.1. In the event of the resignation, incapacity or death of the Federal Leader, the Deputy Federal Leader shall act as Federal Leader until a new Federal Leader is elected by Federal Congress or a special Federal Congress convened for that purpose.
7.8.2. Assist the Federal Leader in executing the political and organisational responsibilities of the Party;
7.8.3. Share in the representation of the Party in public, including campaigns, media, and inter-party engagements, as delegated by the Federal Leader;
7.8.4. Support and drive national campaigns and political strategy to enhance the DA’s status as a party of government;
7.8.5. Provide leadership continuity, ensuring the Party remains stable and effective in the event of the Federal Leader’s temporary unavailability;
7.8.6. Carry out such additional functions as may be assigned by the Federal Leader, the Federal Executive, or the Federal Congress.
Proposer’s motivation:
Consequential amendment ONLY if 6.1.4 is approved
Clause: 9.6.2
Title: Caucus Rules
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
9.6.2. All Caucus Rules must be submitted to the Federal Legal Commission for certification that they are consistent with this Constitution. They must thereafter be submitted to the Federal Executive or Federal Council for approval, depending on which entity meets soonest following completion of the certification process, whereafter they shall come into force take effect.
Proposer’s motivation:
Currently, caucus rules can only be ratified by Federal Council. This appears to be an artifact of prior amendments that did not address the reatificaiton of caucus rules. This amendment seeks to speed up the process for the ratification of caucus rules.
Clause: 10.2.1
Title: Powers and Functions of the Federal Legal Commission
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
10.2.1. The Federal Legal Commission has all powers as are necessary to exercise its functions in terms of this constitutionjustly and expeditiously and must, at the request of the Federal Leader or the Federal Executive or the Federal Council if so instructed:
Proposer’s motivation:
Part of restructuring of section 10.2.
Clause: 10.2.1.9
Title: Powers and Functions of the Federal Legal Commission
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
10.2.1.9. refer a matter for and facilitate mediation proceedings.
Proposer’s motivation:
Currently this section only permits the FLC to refer matters for mediation, whereas the intedned purpose is for the FLC to facilitate those proceedings, as the FLC has historically been doing.
Clause: 10.2.2
Title: Powers and Functions of the Federal Legal Commission
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
10.2.2. Whenever any matter is referred to it by the Federal Leader, or the Federal Executive, Matters may only be referred to the Federal Legal Commission by the
10.2.2.1. Federal Executive;
10.2.2.2. Federal Council;
10.2.2.3. Federal Leader; or,
10.2.2.4. the Disciplinary Tagging Committee;
following which referral, the Federal Legal Commission shall deal with it according to the FLC Rules, provided that:
10.2.2.i. in the absence of a provision in the FLC Rules dealing with a matter, the Federal Legal Commission will follow a process to enable the finding of facts to advise the Disciplinary Tagging Commitee for consideration that is consistent with natural justice; and,
10.2.2.ii. only the Disciplinary Tagging Committee is authorised to refer matters for disciplinary action.
Proposer’s motivation:
This amendment is aimed at better codification of the way in which the Tagging Committee is involved in the referral of matters. Further, this amendment deals with “fact-finding” referrals that are not necessarily disciplinary referrals yet.
Clause: 10.6.2.4 & 10.6.2.5
Title: Procedures Applicable to Disciplinary Proceedings
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 10.6.2.4. whether the complaint shall be referred for processes relating to incapacity; or,
10.2.6.5. if additional information is required to make a determination in terms of section 10.6.2.1 and
10.6.2.2, whether a matter must be referred for the undertaking of a factual investigation.
Proposer’s motivation:
These insertions are aimed at addressing lacunae experienced in respect of matters considered by the Tagging Committee. Often, a matter is clearly one realting to incapacity, whereas others require additional investigation prior to an informed decision can be made as to whether a matter should be referred for disciplinary action or not.
Clause: 10.6.4
Title: Procedures Applicable to Disciplinary Proceedings
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
10.6.4. Federal disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted by a disciplinary panel appointed by the chairperson of the Federal Legal Commission, and which shall be made up of members of the Federal Legal Commission, of which the chairperson of such a panel shall be the holder of a suitable qualification in law. The chairperson of such a panel shall have legal training.
Proposer’s motivation:
The reason for a person with a legal qualification chairing the process was due to the litigious nature of the old disciplinary process. With the new inquisitorial process, there is less focus on strict legalese, with processes being less formal in nature. Additionally, there are many FLC members that are very capable of chairing matters who do not have a legal qualification, which limits the possible composition of Panels. By only requiring that one of the members of a panel be a holder of a legal qualification, legal compliance can still be assured, while broadening the pool of possible chairpersons.
Clause: 10.6.9
Title: Procedures Applicable to Disciplinary Proceedings
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment :
10.6.9. The Federal Executive may amend a sanction imposed by a disciplinary panel within five days without undue delay, but only by a two-thirds majority of members present. If the sanction imposed by the disciplinary panel is termination of membership, the sanction does not take effect until the expiry of the five-day period Federal Executive has taken a decision in this regard.
Proposer’s motivation:
Fedex workload and diaries are becoming more difficult to comply with this section’s 5-day requirement. Wihtout undue delay will enable the Party to accommodate the consideration of sanctions at the earliest opportunity, limiting the possibility of matters being taken on review based solely on this rigid requirement.
Clause: 10.10.4
Title: Appeals to and Reviews by the Federal Legal Commission
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Delete: 10.10.4. Any appeal provided for in this section must be lodged with the Chairperson of the Federal Legal Commission within a period of ten (10) working days after the relevant executive has informed the parties of the decision (or less if the Candidate Selection Regulations so provide).
Proposer’s motivation:
Remnant of previous appeals process. Candidate appeals are still accommodated elsewhere and in terms of the Nomination Regulations. There are no other appeals and have not been since the 2023 amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Clause: 10.12
Title: Reporting to Federal Council
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Delete: 10.12 REPORTING TO FEDERAL COUNCIL
The Federal Legal Commission shall report on all its findings and recommendations, as well as all matters referred to it and which are not yet finalised, to every Federal Council meeting. The Provincial Disciplinary Committee shall likewise report to every Provincial Council Meeting.
Proposer’s motivation:
Duplication of another clause (10.2.3)
Clause: 11.6 & 11.7
Title: Ancillary Organisations
Proposed by: Glynnis Breytenbach
Seconded by: Werner Horn
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 11.6. Where an ancillary organisation enjoys representation to any structure of the Party, such representation shall be dependent on that ancillary organisation being validly constituted.
11.7. Any ancillary structure representative to a higher structure of the party ex officio is automatically vacated from that structure when their term of office in that ancillary has expired.
Proposer’s motivation:
We have experieinced situations where ancilliaries’ representatives to Fedex/PECs cling on to those positions long after their elected term as part of the senior leadership of an ancilliary has lapsed, but where fresh elections have not yet taken place. This clause will seek to “punish” non-compliance with reconstitution requirements.
Clause: 12.2.2
Title: Agreement with Other Parties
Proposed by: Paul Kotzé
Seconded by: Jan-Hendrik Cronje
Proposed amendment:
Insert: 12.2.2. Coalition Agreements
12.2.2.1. Any agreement to form a coalition government at a local/district/provincial sphere of government must be approved by a majority of the Federal Executive, following a recommendation from the relevant provincial executive.
12.2.2.2. Any agreement to form a coalition government in the national sphere of government must be approved by a majority of the Federal Council, following a recommendation from the Federal Executive.
12.2.2.3. All coalition agreements must be made public and be based on a signed, written document that explicitly outlines the principles of the agreement, key policy priorities, and governance protocols.
12.2.2.4. A DA member appointed as a Mayor, Premier, or to an executive position in a coalition government is bound by the terms of the approved coalition agreement. Any material breach of the agreement by said office-bearer may be grounds for misconduct proceedings under section 2.5.4.
Proposer’s motivation:
The DA’s experience in coalitions (e.g., Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay) has often been marred by instability and a lack of clear, binding mandates for its negotiators and public representatives. A constitutional clause would provide a stable, transparent, and accountable framework, moving from ad-hoc decisions to principled policy. It aligns with the value of accountable government (Ch.1) but provides the necessary teeth to enforce it in a coalition context. The strategic decision to enter a national coalition government is the most profound choice the DA can make for the future of South Africa. This decision must rest on the broadest and most representative consensus possible.
We propose a constitutional amendment to move the power to approve entering a national coalition government from the Federal Executive to the Federal Council.
This vital reform will achieve the following:
a. Broaden Mandate and Representation:
A vote by the Federal Council ensures full representation of all provincial and local constituencies. This guarantees a broad consensus and incorporates key voices from our grassroots structures, solidifying the mandate for such a consequential agreement.
b. Eliminate Conflicts of Interest:
Transferring this power removes the potential for a conflict of interest within the Federal Executive, where individuals may stand to gain executive positions in the government that are being negotiated. Our decision-making must be seen as, and must be, entirely focused on the national interest.
c. Co-Develop a Principled Agenda:
The Federal Council is the appropriate body to co-develop the foundational principles and measurable objectives that will drive the DA’s agenda in the national government. This ensures our participation is anchored in clear, non-negotiable goals and a commitment to delivery.
Shifting this power to the Federal Council guarantees that any decision to enter government is democratically secured, ethically unimpeachable, and strategically focused on delivery for all South Africans.
Clause: 13.5
Title: Definitions
Proposed by: Werner Horn
Seconded by: Marius Victor
Proposed amendment:
“good standing” means that, at the time of nomination, selection and election, the member will truthfully declare all details that may be required by the Federal Executive, and that he or she has been a member for at least 30 days, and that he or she is not in arrears with any monies owing to the Party arising from whatever cause, excluding where proof is submitted ofthe arrears being the result of Party administrative negligence/problems. The fact that the Party may have entered into a payment arrangement for any arrears shall not render the person in good standing. Furthermore, a member is deemed to be not in good standing if they have failed to comply fully with any condition or sanction imposed on them, by the Party, after a formal disciplinary process.
Proposer’s motivation:
While the FLC and PDCs have the authority to adjudicate disciplinary matters, the enforcement and compliance with disciplinary findings fall in the purview of Fedex and PECs. There have been instances where the disciplinary process has been completed and members sanctioned, but compliance with the conditions of those sanctions have been shortcoming due to sanctioned members’ recalcitrant attitude. By including the above rider to the definition of “good standing”, the non-cooperation of a sanctioned member with the conditions of a sanction, regardless of the severity of the offence or the sanction imposed, may be taken into consideration in the determination of whether a member is deemed to be in good standing or not.
DA Federal Congress • Getting south africa working •DA Federal Congress • Getting south africa working •
